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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
a. Statement of Facts

This case involves a claim for personal injury by the Appellant, David Stiles, who was a
social guest of a tenant occupying property located at 756 W. 4th Street, Kuna, Idaho 83634.
According to the Amended Complaint filed in this matter, at approximately 1:00 a.m. on July 8,
2011, Mr. Stiles entered the premises to attend a social gathering involving alcohol being held in
the backyard organized and conducted by one of the tenants, Jon Sullivan. (R. pp. 13-14). 1 Jon
Sullivan is Mr. Stiles' cousin. (R. p. 87). Mr. Stiles alleges that at some point during the night,
he attempted to leave the property by exiting the backyard through a gate and onto a walkway
located on the side of the house. (R. p. 14). Mr. Stiles asserts that while exiting the property, he
tripped on a tree limb approximately four inches in diameter and one and a half feet long that
was located on the walkway. (R. p. 14).
Further, Mr. Stiles alleges that the presence of the tree limb caused him to fall forward
into a wooden-frame glass window, which was allegedly standing in the walkway and propped
up against a fence, whereupon he sustained personal injuries. (R. pp. 14-15). There is no dispute
that the Appellant was a social guest of tenant Jon Sullivan. (R. p. 13, 197). Mr. Stiles' primary
allegation in this matter is that Walter Amundson, as the owner of the property, owed him a duty
as a licensee to share his knowledge of dangerous conditions or dangerous activities on the
property and to avoid causing willful and wanton injury to him. (R. p. 17, paragraph 20).
There is no dispute in this case that Mr. Amundson is the owner of the property located at
756 W. 4th Street, Kuna, Idaho 83634. Mr. Amundson purchased the real property at issue in this

1

In the Amended Complaint, the Appellant asserts that tenant Roger Amundson co-hosted the party on
July 8, 2011. However, there is no evidence in the record to support this assertion, as it is undisputed in
the record that Jon Sullivan hosted the party and personally invited the Respondent to attend the party in
the early morning hours of July 8, 2011. (R. p. 61 ).
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litigation sometime in 2007. (R. p. 46). He has never personally resided in the residence and has
always utilized the residence as a rental property. (R. p. 46). He also personally manages the
property and has never utilized the services of a property manager. (R. p. 46).
In July 2011, there were three tenants renting the property at issue. (R. p. 46). The
tenants included Jon Sullivan, Wayne Jenkins and Walter's son, Roger Amundson. (R. p. 46).
The tenants were in charge of keeping the property in a well-kept and clean condition. (R. p.
46). If there were any repairs or maintenance which was needed with respect to the property,

Walter undertook the responsibility pursuant to the lease agreements with the tenants to conduct
such repairs and maintenance. (R. p. 46). 2
Walter Amundson generally visited the rental property twice per month. (R. p. 46). The
primary purpose of those visits was to collect rent from tenants and also to perform any repairs
or maintenance work if notified by one of the tenants that there was an issue with the property to
address. (R. p. 4 7). Examples of some types of maintenance Walter has performed on the
property prior to July 2011 included installing sprinklers, repairing the fence, replacing windows
and fixing the roof. (R. p. 47). However, when visiting the property to collect rent or perform
any requested maintenance, Walter did not generally inspect the entire property, as he respected
the privacy of the tenants and relied on their input as to any concerns they had or maintenance
issues they believed needed to be addressed. (R. p. 47).
Prior to July 2011, Walter did not have any significant problems with the three tenants.
(R. p. 47). All three tenants paid their rent and he had no complaints from neighbors regarding
the tenants. (R. p. 47). Walter was generally aware that one of the tenants, Jon Sullivan, invited

2 Appellant asserts that there is "no dispute that Amundson has exercised complete authority and control
over the property since purchase in 2007." Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 9. This statement was made
without citation and completely mischaracterizes the record, as it is undisputed that there were three
tenants occupying the property pursuant to lease agreements at the time of Mr. Stiles' accident. (R. p.

46).
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people over to the property for social gatherings in the backyard from time to time. (R. p. 4 7).
However, he never received noise or any other complaints from neighbors and he is not aware of
any occasions where law enforcement made a visit to the property due to any complaints or
problems involving Mr. Sullivan's gatherings. (R. p. 47).
Sometime in mid-June 2011, Walter removed a bay window from the home in order to
install a garage door for the property, which would allow the tenants to store items such a
motorcycle inside the garage. (R. p. 47). The window was approximately eight feet long and
four feet high and weighed at least 200 pounds. (R. p. 47). Walter's son Roger helped him
remove the window. (R. p. 47).
Once Walter removed the window from the residence, Roger helped him move it and it
was temporarily placed against a white picket fence next to the driveway at the front of the
property until he could sell the window on Craigslist. 3 (R. p. 48). At the time Walter and his son
placed the window against the white picket fence, the window was intact and there was no
broken glass. (R. p. 48).
Walter later became aware that an incident involving Mr. Stiles occurred on July 8, 2011,
whereby David Stiles allegedly fell and injured himself on the bay window when visiting the
property while attending one of Mr. Sullivan's social gatherings. (R. p. 48). There is no dispute
between the parties that Mr. Stiles was a social guest (licensee) of Mr. Sullivan when visiting the
property at 1:00 a.m. on the morning of July 8, 2011. See Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 6.
Walter Amundson had never met Mr. Stiles prior to the subject lawsuit. (R. p. 48). He was not
3

Appellant states in his Opening Brief (p. 6) that "the window was eventually placed against a cedar
fence in the house's adjacent walkway." This statement mischaracterizes the evidence to the extent it
implies that Walter Amundson had any role in moving the window from the white picket fence next to the
driveway to the cedar fence further back on the side of the property or that he knew that the window was
located next to the cedar fence at the time of the alleged accident. The record reflects that Walter
Amundson played no role in moving the window from the area of the driveway against the white picket
fence and had no awareness that it had become broken or had been moved against the cedar fence prior
to the accident. (R. pp. 48-49). The only facts in the record are that Roger moved the window himself.

(R. p. 60).
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made aware of the alleged incident involving Mr. Stiles until a few days after it allegedly
occurred. (R. p. 48). When Walter Amundson came to the property in mid-July 2011 to collect
rent, tenant Wayne Jenkins generally explained to him that an incident occurred and Walter was
shown the area where the incident allegedly occurred. (R. p. 48).
Upon investigating the incident, Walter Amundson learned, for the first time, that the bay
window was not in the location where he had initially placed it after removing it from the
residence. (R. p. 48). Instead of leaning up against the white picket fence at the front of the
property, it was leaning up against the cedar fence further back on the side of the property. (R. p.
48). The only facts in the record are that Roger Amundson had moved the window to this
location by himself. (R. pp. 60, 233-244). 4 Walter Amundson also noticed upon investigating
the accident that the window was broken.

(R. p. 48). 5

However, Walter was unable to
'

determine whether it became broken as a result of the incident involving Mr. Stiles. (R. p. 48).
It was only after the subject lawsuit was filed that Walter came to learn that the window

had become broken by one of the tenants while stored at the front of the property along the white
picket fence. (R. p. 48). None of the tenants had informed him about the broken window prior
to Mr. Stiles' accident. (R. pp. 118-119). He also learned that, at some point after the window
had broken, it was moved by tenant Roger Amundson on only one occasion, and placed further
back on the property and propped up against the cedar fence on the side of the residence. (R. pp.
48-49, 233-244). It also wasn't until after the lawsuit was filed that Walter learned that the
accident occurred when Mr. Stiles tripped on a wooden stump (apparently placed in that location

4

The Appellant both misstates and incorrectly cites testimony from tenant Wayne Jenkins related to his
recollection of the movement of the window from along the picket fence next to the driveway to the area
where the accident occurred. See Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 12. Mr. Jenkins actually testified that
" ... all I know is that Roger moved it." (R. p. 233, depo p. 19:15-19).
5 Appellant misstates the record by implying that Walter Amundson may have seen the broken window
when he visited the property on June 5 or 6, 2011. However, in his deposition, Walter clearly testified that
he did not recall checking on the window during that visit and was very clear in his deposition testimony
that he did not notice a shattered pane in the window during the visit. (R. pp. 118-119).
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by another tenant) which was resting on the pathway on the side of the house and fell into the
window that, unbeknownst to Walter, had been moved from the white picket fence to the cedar
fence in this area. (R. p. 49).
Prior to the accident, Walter Amundson was never made aware that the tenants had
placed or were storing any items on the side of the yard. (R. p. 49). He was also not aware of
the existence of a wooden stump or the bay window being relocated in that area at the time of the
alleged accident. (R. p. 49). While it is unknown who actually placed the wooden stump on the
side of the house in the walkway, at least two things are clear: First, the wooden stump was not
placed in this location by Walter Amundson; Second, the tenants knew that the wooden stump
was in this location, but cannot agree on when the stump was placed in that location. Jon
Sullivan recalls that nothing was placed in that area prior to July 8, 2011. (R. p. 97). Roger
Amundson recalls that the stump may have been sitting in that location when he moved the
broken window against the cedar fence (R. pp. 159-160). Regardless, there are no facts in the
record that Walter Amundson knew about the broken window, the fact that it had been moved
from the white picket fence or the existence of the wooden stump on the pathway on the side of
the home prior to Mr. Stiles' accident. Moreover, he did not have "authority and control" over
the premises since, as the landlord, he had to relinquish control to the three tenants occupying the
property.
The Appellant also raises a number of facts regarding the allegedly poor lighting in the
area where the accident occurred and the manner in which that condition may have contributed
to the trip/fall event.

See Appellant's Opening Brief, pp. 13-14. However, these facts are

irrelevant to the duty of care issues in this case. The proper focus of this case is which party had
the duty to warn the Appellant about any hazards presented by the presence of a wooden stump
in the walkway on the side of the house.
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b. Course of Proceedings Below

Appellant Stiles filed his First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial on or
about October 4, 2013.

Walter Amundson filed an Answer to the Amended Complaint on

October 24, 2013. After significant discovery had been conducted and depositions taken, Mr.
Amundson filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on January 20, 2015. In his motion, Mr.
Amundson argued that he did not owe a duty to warn Mr. Stiles about the existence of stump in
the walkway or any potential danger caused by the presence of the broken window standing in
the walkway and leaning up against a cedar fence on the side of the house. (R. pp. 26-43). Mr.
Amundson asserted that the tenants, who were in control of the property, had created the alleged
dangerous condition and they had the duty to warn Mr. Stiles, as they were in the best position to
warn their own social guests of any potential dangerous conditions existing on the property. (R.
pp. 26-43). Since Mr. Stiles had not asserted claims against the tenants, there was no available
remedy to him in this lawsuit.
The District Court heard argument on the summary judgment motion on March 9, 2015.
The District Court first addressed Mr. Stiles' argument that Mr. Amundson, as the landlord, had
a duty under Stephens v. Stearns to provide a warning of potentially dangerous conditions
existing on the property to a tenant's social guest. The court found that the Stephens case had no
application to this matter since Stephens involved a landlord's duty to his tenant, who is an
invitee, not a licensee. (Tr. p. 21). The court also correctly cited the applicable duty owed by a
possessor of property to a licensee - that there is a duty to warn the licensee of known dangers.
(Tr. p. 38).
The District Court then discussed the Idaho Court of Appeals decision in Robinson v.
Mueller, noting that the Court in Robinson had rejected the contention that the duty of

reasonable care owed by landlords to tenants should be extended to licensees. (Tr. pp. 38-39).
Respondent's Brief - - 6

The court recognized that under Robinson, a landlord who conducts a repair to the property has a
duty to do so in a non-negligent manner. (Tr. p. 40). However, the District Court found that
Walter Amundson's removal of the window from the home was not the mechanism of injury in
the case. (Tr. p. 40). Rather, the court found that the mechanism of injury was the combination
of a dark walkway, the presence of a piece of wood in the walking path, and a broken window
upon which someone stumbling on the wood could fall and injure themselves. (Tr. p. 40).
Importantly, the District Court recognized "[t]he landlord has no duty to control the social
activities of the tenant. And it is the social activities of the tenants that lead to the entrance by
Mr. Stiles." (Tr. p. 41). Since the tenants, not the landlord, had a duty to warn Mr. Stiles of any
known dangers existing on the property, the District Court granted Mr. Amundson's motion for
summary judgment. (Tr. pp. 41-42).

II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A. Whether the District Court correctly granted summary judgment to Respondent on
Appellant's premises liability claim on the basis that Respondent had no duty to warn
the Appellant, a licensee, of alleged dangerous condition(s) on the property.
B. Whether there is any factual or legal basis to hold Respondent liable for the
Appellant's injuries due to a negligent repair of the property.
C. Whether Respondent is entitled to an award of attorney's fees on appeal.

III. STAND ARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review on appeal from an order granting summary judgment is the same
standard that is used by the district court in ruling on the motion. Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho
166, 170, 16 P.3d 263, 267 (2000). Summary judgment is appropriate only when the pleadings,
depositions, affidavits and admissions on file show that there is no genuine issue of material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. LR.CP. 56(c); McCann v.
Respondent's Brief - - 7

McCann., 138 Idaho 228, 232, 61 P.3d 585, 589 (2002). If the evidence reveals no disputed

issues of material fact, then only a question of law remains, over which the Idaho Supreme Court
exercises free review. Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, 134 Idaho 84, 87-88, 996
P.2d 303, 307-308, (2000).
IV. ARGUMENT
a. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE RESPONDENT
(AS A LANDLORD) DID NOT HAVE A DUTY TOWARN THE APPELLANT
(A SOCIAL GUEST/LICENSEE OF HIS TENANT) OF POTENTIAL
DANGERS ON THE PROPERTY

The Appellant begins his argument on appeal by advocating for the application of general
negligence principles and asserting that this case involves mixed issues of law and disputed facts.

See Appellant's Opening Brief, pp. 18-19. Such argument completely ignores the reality that the
legal duties in this case are narrowly prescribed by common law principles of premises liability
that have firmly been established by Idaho's appellate courts. The record clearly establishes that
Walter Amundson was not aware of the broken window at issue or the existence of a wooden
stump placed in the walkway at the side of the house by one of the tenants. Regardless of his
knowledge, however, Walter Amundson had no legal duty to warn the Appellant regarding these
alleged conditions and cannot reasonably be expected to police the rental property to warn a
particular tenant's social guests regarding potential hazards created by one of the tenants.
The primary issue in this case is the scope of the duty of care owed by a landlord to his
tenant's social guest. This issue has previously been addressed by Idaho's appellate courts and
the rule is clear: while a landlord owes a general duty of care to his tenant (who occupies the
status of an invitee) a landlord does not owe a duty to the tenant's social guest (who occupies the
status of a licensee) to warn of dangers that may exist on the property. As a result, the Appellant
is not really arguing that the District Court erred in its application of the law to the facts of this
Respondent's Brief - - 8

matter. Rather, the Appellant, relying primarily on Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 678
P .2d 41 (1984), seeks to either eliminate the distinctions between invitees and licensees
altogether, or expand the duties of a landlord such that all entrants on a rental property should be
classified as invitees. By doing so, the Appellant asks this Court to ignore established precedent
and the logical and sound public policy reasons why Idaho appellate courts have declined to
expand a landlord's premises liability duties to a social guest (licensee) of a tenant.
1. Premises Liability Law in Idaho with Regard to a Licensee/Social Guest.

Idaho has clearly established the duties owed by the occupier of the premises to an
injured third person based on the status of the injured person at the time of the injury. The reason
these distinctions were created was a recognition that the scope of duty should be tied to factors
such as the occupier's knowledge concerning the risk, the control which the occupier can
reasonably exercise over the source of the risk and the nature of the visit and the entrants'
expectations of what they will encounter when visiting the land. See Keller v. Holiday Inns,
Inc., 105 Idaho 649, 652, 671 P.2d 1112, 1115 (1983).

"The distinction between

trespassers, licensees, and invitees is the controlling test in determining the scope and extent of
the duty of care owed by landowners to entrants." O'Guin v. Bingham County, 139 Idaho 9, 14,
72 P.3d 849, 854 (2003); See also Holzheimer v. Johannesen, 125 Idaho 397, 399, 871 P.2d
814, 816 (1994); Boots v. Winters, 145 Idaho 389, 393, 179 P.3d 352,356, (Ct. App. 2008).
The Appellant cites a number of cases from other jurisdictions which have utilized
different legal standards in analyzing the duties of a landlord to entrants on land. See Appellant's
Opening Brief, pp. 22-23. However, Idaho appellate courts have not abolished the common law

distinctions between the duties owed to entrants on land and, as set forth below, have continued
over the past thirty years to emphasize the sound legal and policy reasons for keeping such
distinctions intact.
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As set forth above, there is no dispute that the Appellant was a licensee/social guest of
the tenant. "A licensee is a visitor who goes upon the premises of another with the consent of the
landowner in pursuit of the visitor's purpose. Likewise, a social guest is also a licensee."
Holzheimer, 125 Idaho at 400, 871 P.2d at 817. The "duty owed to a licensee is narrow. A

landowner is only required to share with the licensee knowledge of dangerous conditions or
activities on the land." Id. The Idaho Court of Appeals inEvans v. Park, 112 Idaho 400, 732
P.2d 369 (Ct. App. 1987) noted:
A person who enters the property of another with passive
permission or as a mere social guest traditionally has been held to
understand that he must take the land as the possessor uses it. This
entrant, classified by the law as a licensee, is expected to be alert
and to protect himself from the risks he encounters. Accordingly,
the duty owed to a licensee with respect to such risks is narrowly
restricted. The possessor is required simply to share his knowledge
of dangerous conditions or dangerous activities with the licensee.
When such a warning has been given, the possessor's knowledge is
no longer superior to that of the licensee, and the possessor's duty
extends no farther.
Id. at 401, 732 P.2d at 370, quoting Keller v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 105 Idaho 649, 652-53, 671
P.2d 1112, 1115-16 (Ct.App.1983), vacated on other grounds, 107 Idaho 593, 691 P.2d 1208
(1984). 6
Seven years later, the Idaho Supreme Court confirmed the duty owed by a possessor of
land toward a licensee/social guest in Holzheimer v. Johannesen (1994), supra.

The

Holzheimer Court recognized the distinction between invitees and licensees, stating that the

possessor owes an invitee a duty of reasonable care. Id. at 399-400, 871 P.2d at 816-17.
However, the Holzheimer Court found that a possessor of the premises "is only required to share
with the licensee knowledge of dangerous conditions or activities on the land." Id. at 400, 871

6

It should be noted that Evans (1987) was a case that post-dated Stephens v. Stearns (1984), a case
primarily relied upon by the Appellant, by three years.
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P.2d at 817.

Certainly, the Holzheimer Court would have been aware of Stephens v.

Stearns holding and yet did not broaden its holding to include guests of tenants in the same

category as an invitee or eliminate the distinctions between invitees and licensees altogether.
Indeed, Idaho appellate courts have confirmed this distinction multiple times. See,
e.g., Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 257-258, 678 P.2d 41, 49-50 (1984) (a landlord's

tenant should henceforth be included in the category of invitees); Marcher v. Butler, 113 Idaho
867, 871, 749 P.2d 486, 490 (1988) (the Idaho Supreme Court included employees in the
category of invitees); Boots v. Winters, 145 Idaho 389, 393, 179 P.3d 352, 356 (Ct. App. 2008)
(landlord did not owe victims duty under premises liability to protect them from injury caused by
tenant's dog); Ball v. City of Blackfoot, 152 Idaho 673, 677, 273 P.3d 1266, 1270 (2012) (the
duty owed to a person injured on the land is determined by the status of the person; the occupant
of the property must only warn a licensee or social guest of a dangerous condition known or
which should have been known by the occupant).
This Court was asked to abandon the duty of care distinctions between invitees and
licensees in Rountree v. Boise Baseball, LLC, 154 Idaho 167, 296 P.3d 373 (2013).

In

Rountree, a fan at a Boise Hawks baseball game was injured when struck by a foul ball. Id., at

169. The defendant, Boise Baseball, sought to dismiss the case, arguing that rather than being
held accountable under Idaho's common law premises liability standards, Idaho appellate courts
should adopt the Baseball Rule, which limits the duty of stadium operators to spectators hit by
foul balls. Id. This Court declined to adopt the Baseball Rule in place of the application of
established premises liability precedent, noting that there was no compelling public policy
requiring it to do so. Id., at 172.
Idaho appellate courts have not wavered with respect to the duty owed to a licensee/social
guest. Moreover, Idaho law is clear as to the classification of the party owing the duty in the
Respondent's Brief - - 11

context of social guests to residential property, leased or otherwise. It is the possessor/occupier
of the property, not the owner of the property, who owes the licensee/social guest the duty of
care. See Evans v. Park, 112 Idaho at 401, 732 P.2d at 370. In fact, in Harrison v. Taylor, 115
Idaho 588, 768 P.2d 1321 (1989), the Court effectively stated that a tenant steps into the shoes of
the landlord if the tenant is the occupier of the premises and is aware of the alleged dangerous
condition. Id. at 596, 768 P.2d at 1329. In Harrison, the Court considered a claim where an
injured third person sued the lessee and owner of a business establishment for injuries. Thus, the
claimant there was an invitee as opposed to the Appellant in the instant matter. Id. at 589-90,
768 P.2d at 1322-23. Notwithstanding, the Harrison Court stated:
[A] tenant or lessee, having control of the premises is deemed, so
far as third parties are concerned, to be the owner, and in case of·
injury to third parties occasioned by the condition or use of the
premises, the general rule is that the tenant or lessee may be
liable for failure to keep the premises in repair.
Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588,596, 768 P.2d 1321, 1329 (1989) (citations omitted).
In Mooney v. Robinson, 93 Idaho 676, 471 P.2d 63 (1970), the plaintiff was a guest at a

house rented by the defendant Robinson when she slipped and fell down a flight of stairs. Id. at
677-678, 471 P.2d at 64-65. The plaintiff sued the tenant Robinson, not the owner or landlord.
The Court affirmed the trial court's offered jury instructions, including an instruction which
provided the occupier of the premises "has a duty to warn the licensee of the condition or
otherwise obviate its risks." Id. at 678,471 P.2d at 65.
Ultimately, the case authority in Idaho is clear that the possessor or tenant of the premises
at issue is the party that owes the licensee/social guest a duty to warn of known dangerous
conditions because the tenant steps into the shoes of the owner/landlord with regard to said
dangerous conditions. This rule represents sound policy because, to the extent the tenant is
aware of the existence of a potential adverse condition on the property, the tenant is in the best
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position to provide a warning to the social guest. The tenant is also in the best position to control
the existence and/or remediation of potential adverse conditions on the property that the tenant
creates. Furthermore, the landlord has no control over the guests hosted on the premises by the
tenant.
2. Stephens v. Stearns Was Intended to Clarify a Landlord's Common Law
Duty to a Tenant so as to be Consistent with Other Components of Idaho
Premises Liability Law.

The Appellant primarily argues on appeal that the Idaho Supreme Court never intended in
Stephens to limit the landlord's duty ofreasonable care to tenants only and that such duty should

be extended to all entrants to the rental property. See Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 23. This
argument ignores not only the clear analysis contained in the Stephens decision, but later
precedent which has applied Stephens.

The Appellant errs when arguing that the Court

in Stephens v. Stearns, supra, brought to an end the old common law rule oflandlord immunity
and held that landlords are required to "exercise reasonable care under the circumstances"
toward all who come onto the property. See Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 21; Stephens v.
Stearns, 106 Idaho at 257,678 P.2d at 49.

The Court in Stephens abrogated the landlord's traditional immunity from a tenant's suit
for injuries resulting from dangerous conditions existing at the time of leasing, along with the
numerous exceptions to the application of the immunity, in favor of the more modern approach
whereby duties are owed based on the classification of the party entering the land. The Court
specifically ruled that it intended to "leave the common-law rule [of general landlord immunity]
and its exceptions behind, and . . . adopt the rule that a landlord is under a duty to exercise
reasonable care in light of all the circumstances." Stephens, I 06 Idaho at 258, 678 P.2d at 50.
Appellant interprets the words, "in light of all the circumstances" in Stephens to mean "under all
circumstances," regardless of the status of the injured person.
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However, the Appellant mistakenly reads the Stephens decision as having eliminated the
premises liability distinctions between injured third persons who come onto the property of
another with respect to the duty owed. Stephens, as the Court is certainly aware, regarded a
situation where a tenant was injured when falling in a stairway that provided access to her
apartment. Stephens, l 06 Idaho at 252, 678 P .2d at 44. The Stephens decision was therefore
factually limited to the circumstances of a landlord and the proper legal status of the tenant, i.e.,
whether the tenant was an invitee or a licensee. Stephens did not consider the status of a social
guest of a tenant. Its holding was limited to the detennination that a landlord owes his or her
tenant a duty of reasonable care. Stephens, 106 Idaho at 257-58, 678 P.2d at 49-50. The Court
also noted that its embracement of this rule with regard to the duty owed by a landlord to its
tenant was also supported by the Idaho Legislature's enactment of the statutory version of the
implied warranty of habitability, I.C. § 6-320. Stephens, 106 Idaho at 258,678 P.2d at 50, n.3.
As the Appellant notes in his briefing, the Stephens court cited a New Hampshire
Supreme Court opinion in Sargent v. Ross, 308 A.2d 528 (N.H. 1973) to support its ruling.
However, Appellant mischaracterizes the holding in Sargent and its use by the Court in
Stephens. In Sargent, a child being babysat by a tenant fell to her death from an allegedly

defectively designed and constructed outdoor stairway in a residential building. Sargent, 308
A.2d at 530.

The Sargent court found that the landlord owed a duty of care in the case,

especially where the allegations were related to an alleged defect in a stairway permanently
attached to the property. The Sargent court also noted that the landlord, who retained ownership
of the premises and any physical improvements thereto, should bear the costs of repair to make
the premises safe. Id at 534-35.
A full reading of Sargent clearly indicates that New Hampshire Supreme Court was
primarily concerned with the blanket landlord tort immunity that had previously existed in the
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common law and the need to create a more workable framework for liability in situations where
the tenant plays no role in creating the risk and can do nothing to remedy the potential hazard.
Id., at 532.

As a result, Sargent is completely distinguishable from the case at bar. Mr.

Amundson did not create the risk (the tenants placed the wooden stump in the walkway) and the
tenants were in a far superior position to remedy the hazard and/or warn their guests of the
potential danger it posed.
Moreover, there is no language in Step/tens which can be interpreted to suggest that the
Idaho Supreme Court intended to utilize Sargent as persuasive authority to adopt a completely
different premises liability framework. Rather, in Step/tens this Court cited Sargent, and a
number of other foreign appellate cases, primarily for the proposition that there was sufficient
rationale for abrogating the general landlord common law immunity with respect to the
landlord's tenant. This Court did not go so far as to adopt a position that a landlord had a duty of
care to make a leased premises safe for all entrants regardless of classification or circumstances.
Appellant also attempts to make the argument that this Court has issued decisions postStephens that support the proposition that a landlord owes a general duty of care to any entrant

to the leased premises. These cases are distinguishable and set forth policy issues that are not
present in this case. For instance, Appellant cites Marcher v. Butler, 113 Idaho 867, 749 P.2d
486 (1988). In Marcher, the injured paiiy plaintiff was an employee of the tenant and sued
the landlord/defendant. Id. at 868, 749 P.2d at 487. The injured party was not a social guest.
The Court in Marcher recognized that an employee is on the premises for a business purpose and
is more akin to an invitee, a clear distinction with a social guest. The Court noted that there was
a logical reason for this distinction because "an employee will proceed to encounter the
dangerous condition in order to keep his or her job.

In the present case the plaintiff was

performing duties on the second floor of the condominium at the request of the tenant." Id. at
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871, 749 P.2d at 490. Thus, the Marcher Court stated that the correct standard to apply to the
circumstance

where

an employee is

injured

is

that

"a

lessor

may

be

liable

to

an invitee/employee who suffered injuries proximately caused by unsafe condition of the
premises even though the danger is obvious and known to such invitee." Id. at 871, 749 P.2d at
490. 7
The Appellant also cites this Court's opinion in Sharp as authority for the proposition
that common law premises liability distinctions should no longer be applied in Idaho. In Sharp

v. W.H. Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297, 769 P.2d 506 (1990), this Court found that the owner of a
building had a duty of care to prevent unreasonable foreseeable risk of harm to a worker
employed in the building under the circumstances. This Court stated:
The question of whether a landlord owes a duty of reasonable care
to the tenants of the property was settled by our recent decision
in Stephens v. Stearns, . . . In addition to the clear rule
of Stephens, other legal principles favor the recognition of a
requirement of due care in the circumstances present here. One is
the familiar proposition that one who voluntarily assumes a duty
also assumes the obligation of due care in performance of that
duty. A landlord, having voluntarily provided a security system, is
potentially subject to liability if the security system fails as a result
of the landlord's negligence.

Sharp, 118 Idaho at 300 (emphasis added). The primary basis for liability in Sharp was the fact
that the landlord had undertaken a duty voluntarily and had acted negligently.
More importantly, for purposes of this matter, at no time did the Court in Stephens,

Marcher, or Sharp for that matter, discuss and expand the scope of the duty owed to a social
guest of a tenant. That is, none of those decisions eliminated the traditional status of a licensee.
Rather, those Courts simply expanded the definition of an invitee to include the tenant of
a landlord or an employee working on a leased premises, but did not include the guests of
7 In his opening brief, the Appellant never attempts to cite the controlling opinion in Marcher, opting
instead to cite as persuasive authority the concurring opinion from that case.
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tenants.
Unfortunately, the Appellant refuses to read Stephens in the context it was intended, i.e.,
to reconcile with Idaho Code § 6-320 and Idaho's common law premises liability regime. Not
only does Appellant's argument represent an unsupp01ied and expansive stretch

of

the Stephens holding, it is completely illogical in light of decades of decisions subsequent to
Stephens developing premises liability law in Idaho with regard to the distinction between the

status of the injured person and relative duties owed.
The Appellant also ignores the fact that this Comi has had opportunities to further clarify
its holding in Stephens in subsequent cases and has done so. In Stevens v. Fleming, 116 Idaho
523, 525-26 777 P.2d 1196, 1198-99 (1989), this Court specifically noted that the holding in
Stephens v. Stearns was that "[a] landlord is required to exercise reasonable care to his tenants

in light of all the circumstances." (emphasis added). In Jesse v. Lindsley, 149 Idaho 70, 75, 233
P.3d 1, 6 (2008), this Court noted that the status of the law with regard to a landlord's duty to a
tenant is that "a landlord must exercise reasonable care under the circumstances for the
protection of his residential tenant." (emphasis added). These cases should put to rest any notion
that the Court's decision in Stephens was intended to establish that landlords owe all third
parties the same standard of care, regardless of classification or purpose of visiting the property.

3. The Legal Standard Regarding Duties Owed to Licensees is Unchanged
Under Idaho Law and Should Remain So.
Neither this Court nor the Court of Appeals have expanded the definition of invitee to
include socials guests of a residential tenant. The duty owed remains a duty to warn the social
guest, or licensee, of known "dangerous conditions or activities on the land." See Ball v. City of
Blackfoot, 152 Idaho at 677,273 P.3d at 1270. Moreover, the appellate courts ofidaho have not

held that the duty owed to the social guest is owed by anyone other than the possessor of
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residential property. To the contrary, it is the host, or person in possession of the premises
deemed to be the owner, who is required to share with the guest his or her knowledge of
dangerous conditions. Id.; See also Wilson v. Bogert, 81 Idaho 535, 545, 347 P.2d 341, 34 7
(1959); Evans v. Park, 112 Idaho at 401, 732 P.2d at 370, and Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho at
596, 768 P.2d at 1329.
The issue was most recently addressed in the Idaho Court of Appeals' decision in
Robinson v. Mueller, 156 Idaho 237, 322 P.3d 319 (Ct. App. 2014). In the Robinson case,

Marquardt (the landlord) owned a two-story home and rented the second level as an apartment to
the tenant. Id. 156 Idaho at 238, 322 P.3d at 320. The apartment's bedroom contained access
out onto the roof through a recessed dormer. Id. A door opened out onto the dormer and the
dormer did not contain any railings. Id.
One night, the tenant brought a friend (Robinson) back to his apartment. Inside the
bedroom, the tenant opened the door to the dormer to let in cool air and to enjoy the view. Id.
While the tenant was outside, Robinson walked toward the recessed dormer. Id. As she went
through the doorway, she tripped and fell, sustaining injury. Id. She sued the landlord for
damages resulting from the fall on the basis of premises liability. Id.
The Court first determined that the tenant owed Robinson a duty under premises liability
standards to warn her that the dormer did not contain any railings. Id., 156 Idaho at 241, 322
P.3d at 323. Turning next to the issue of a landlord's liability to the tenant's social guest, the
Court of Appeals addressed Robinson's argument that the decision in Harrison v. Taylor (cited
above) compelled a determination that the landlord also owed her a duty of care. Id. Harrison
involved a factual scenario where a patron was injured in a fall on a private sidewalk in front of a
business and sued both the landlord and tenant. The Court in Robinson agreed that the Harrison
decision stands for the proposition that owners of land are under a duty of ordinary care under
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the circumstances toward invitees who come upon their premises. See Harrison, 115 Idaho at
596, 768 P.2d at 1329; Robinson, 156 Idaho at 240, 322 P.3d at 322.
However, the Court in Robinson noted that the Harrison decision revealed two key
points:
First, this expansion of a landlord's duty-to require reasonable care
under the circumstances-was addressing only the duty owed to
invitees. Second, tenants are held responsible as if they were the
owner with respect to third parties .... A landlord generally is not
responsible for injuries to third persons in privity with the tenant
which are caused by failure to keep or put the demised premises in
good repair.
Robinson, 156 Idaho at 240-241, 322 P.3d at 322-323. 8 The Court in Robinson further found

that although the landlord may have made general repairs to the premises, such acts did not
equate to a duty to make the premises safe to licensees. Id., 156 Idaho at 241, 322 P.3d at 323.
Moreover, the Court found that the injury sustained to the claimant was not specifically related to
a negligent act of repair conducted by the landlord. Id.
The Court in Robinson also found that the landlord did not owe a duty to warn the
claimant of the dangers of the dormer. Id. Rather, under existing case law, the landlord's duty
to warn existed only with respect to its tenant, due to the tenant's status of an invitee. Id. In fact,
the Court of Appeals specifically addressed the claimant's contention that the Idaho Supreme
Court's decision in Stephens effectively abolished the general distinction of invitees, licensees,
and trespassers in the context of residential rented properties. The Court of Appeals noted that it
"[ did] not read Stephens so broadly.

Stephens specifically addressed the relationship of a

landlord and tenant and its holding is limited to that precise context." Id., 156 Idaho at 241, 322

8 The Court in Robinson did write in a footnote to the decision that a landlord could potentially be liable in
certain limited circumstances but that the duty of a landlord to third parties is not one of reasonable care
under the circumstances. Robinson, 156 Idaho at 240, n.2. It appears from a full reading of the
Robinson decision that such a limited situation would be, for example, if the landlord conducted a repair
to the premises and the negligent performance of that repair work caused injury to a third party.
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P.3d at 323. Ultimately, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that, as between a tenant's social guest
and the landlord, the landlord owes a duty only to the extent that, if the landlord voluntarily
undertakes repairs on the premises, the landlord must exercise reasonable care in performing
such repairs. Id.

The tenant occupies the position of landowner with respect to its guests

because the tenant is the individual in control of the premises during the lease and has control
over the guests hosted in the apartment. Id.
The decisions of Idaho's appellate courts in this area also reflect common sense
reasoning. The possessor of property has the duty to warn a licensee/social guest of known
dangerous conditions due to the possessor's superior knowledge as to such conditions when
compared to any other pruiy (and/or because the possessor may have created the hazard). Once
again, the landlord has no control over the guests hosted on the premises or the activities
conducted by the tenants. For instance, in this case the Appellant argues that Walter Amundson
exercised complete authority and control over the premises. See Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 7.
However, the record is clear that the premises at issue were rented by three tenants and the
alleged hazard at issue in this case (the presence of a tree stump in the walkway) was created by
the tenants. The concept of a tenancy clearly entails the landlord relinquishing control of the
premises and surrendering the right to enter the property at his/her own choosing. See, e.g.,
Worden v. Ordway, 105 Idaho 719, 722, 672 P.2d 1049, 1052 (1983) ("In Idaho there is an
implied covenant in every lease for quiet enjoyment of the property.")
It would be nearly impossible to fashion a workable rule whereby a landlord owes a duty
to warn a tenant's social guests of potential dangers existing on the property where the landlord
does not control or have possession of the property and cannot reasonably be expected to be
aware of all potential hazards on the property during the time the leasehold is in effect (and
specifically at the time the social guest is present) especially where the tenant(s) may be the
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source of creating such hazards, as is the case here. Moreover, it would be impractical (and
likely unlawful, infringing on the tenant's right of quiet enjoyment of the property) for a landlord
to constantly inspect and police the property to rectify potential dangers or warn every potential
social guest who visits the property. The cun-ent state of the law is logical in practice - a tenant
(who is intimately familiar with the rental premises) owes the duty to warn his own social guest
of known potential hazards existing on the property because the tenant is in the best position to
do so.
The Appellant's position is also untenable because it forces residential landlords to warn
every guest of a tenant about any dangerous conditions, regardless of whether the landlord had
already warned the tenant of the same. Essentially, this would always force liability against the
landlord for the tenant's negligence in failing to warn a social guest, making the landlord the
ultimate insurer regardless of the tenant's duty. This result would be contradictory to Idaho law,
as well as public policy, because it would place an inconceivably costly and onerous burden on
landlords. In sum, the law in Idaho is well established and there are sound logical and public
policy reasons for not holding a landlord accountable to warn a tenant's social guests of potential
dangers on the property.
4. The Facts of this Case Do Not Present Compelling Reasons to Change
Established Precedent and Policy.
The Appellant also has not presented a compelling public policy reason and/or cited facts
related to the case at bar which sufficiently advocates for a complete change in Idaho premises
liability law. In this case, Walter Amundson did not occupy the property at issue. Rather, there
were three tenants leasing the property. Those tenants had control over the property and any
conditions which may have presented a danger of injury to an invited social guest. However, the
Appellant did not bring suit against the parties actually in control of the property, including his
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own cousin (Jon Sullivan) who was both able and under a legal duty to provide warnings of any
potentially dangerous conditions to social guests.

The correct defendants in this matter should

have been the tenants since Walter Amundson did not place a wooden stump obstacle on the side
yard in the walkway, did not break the window at issue, and did not move the window next to the
walkway on the side of the house where it could have been a danger to anyone encountering and
failing to notice the wooden stump while walking in the area.
In fact, the facts in this case are far more benign than those established in Robinson. The
factual scenario in Robinson involved a permanent condition of the land (lack of handrails) that
was not created by the tenant. In Robinson, the landlord was fully aware that the roof access
through a recessed dormer did not contain any protective railings, an undeniably dangerous
condition. Once again, however, the Court of Appeals found that the tenant was in a better
position to warn his social guest of the inherent dangers related to the lack of a railing and,
therefore, had the sole legal duty to do so.
In this matter, there is no evidence in the record that Mr. Amundson created the hazard at
ISsue. The hazard involving the location of the wooden stump, in proximity to the broken
window, was not a permanently existing hazard on the land. The hazard at issue was entirely of
the tenants' own making. There is no evidence in the record that Walter Amundson was aware
or should have known of the hazard at issue in this case. To the extent that the Appellant asserts
that they are entitled to an inference Walter Amundson knew or should have known about both
the broken window and wooden stump (as referenced in Appellant's Opening Brief, pp. 18-19),
he clearly had no superior knowledge of those conditions than the tenants, who created the
hazard. The application of sound public policy supports a rule whereby a tenant who has
knowledge of and/or creates a hazardous condition should have the duty to warn his/her social
guests regarding the hazard.
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However, the scope of Mr. Amundson's knowledge regarding the hazard (or any
inferences raised by the Appellant that Walter Amundson should have known about the hazard
presented by the stump being present in proximity of a broken window) is immaterial. Pursuant
to established appellate case law in Idaho, it was Walter Amundson's tenants who had the duty
to warn their social guest of the hazard, as Mr. Amundson could not reasonably be expected to
constantly police the property and warn every social guest of any conceivable or potential
danger, including those caused by the tenants themselves. Both the wooden stump and broken
window constituted objects over which the tenants had full control with respect to where to store
them and/or how to warn invited social guests or otherwise ensure a safe environment for their
guests.
The Appellant argues that this Court should find that Mr. Amundson owed Stiles a duty
to warn of dangerous conditions existing on the property which he either knew about or should
have known. Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 32. However, even if this Court were to modify the
premises liability standard in Idaho regarding landlords and, as a result, find that Walter
Amundson owed a duty of reasonable care to the Appellant, there are no facts in the record to
support a finding that he breached any such standard. Once again, Mr. Amundson did not create
the hazard, was not aware of the hazard and could not reasonably be expected to police the
premises to ensure the safety of his tenants' guests with regard to tenant-created hazards.
Appellant also argues that, to the extent it can be implied that Mr. Amundson had
knowledge of the dangerous condition presented by the window, he had a duty to share such
knowledge with Stiles. See Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 34. Of course, Appellant is merely
speculating as to Mr. Amundson's alleged knowledge, as there are no facts in the record to create
such an inference. Moreover, the Appellant's focus on the bay window is a red herring, given
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that the trip/fall hazard at issue was the presence of the wooden stump in the walkway, a
condition created by the tenants.
Ultimately, the District Court correctly applied the law in determining that Walter
Amundson had no duty to warn the Appellant regarding the potential hazard presented by the
wooden stump and/or broken window. Therefore, the Respondent requests that this Court affirm
the trial court's finding that Respondent did not breach a duty of care.
b. THERE IS NO LEGAL OR FACTUAL BASIS CREATING A MATERIAL
ISSUE FOR TRIAL THAT RESPONDENT IS LIABLE ON THE BASIS OF A
NEGLIGENT REPAIR OF THE PROPERTY
Finally, the Appellant argues that Mr. Amundson should be held liable to Stiles for the
allegedly negligent repair performed on the bay window. Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 34.
There is no dispute among the parties that, prior to the accident, Walter Amundson conducted a
home improvement project related to the subject property and removed a bay window from the
home in order to install a garage door for the property, which would allow the tenants to store
items such as a motorcycle in the garage.

(R. p. 47).

Appellant asserts that this action

represented a "repair" to the property and that Walter Amundson negligently performed the
repair by placing the window in a walkway accessed by social guests at night and in failing to
follow up regarding the condition of the window once it was shattered and moved further up the
walkway. See Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 36. These allegations are intended to create some
basis of liability in this case based on language contained in the Robinson decision indicating
that there is a limited duty between a landlord and a social guest such that "the landlord owes a
duty to the extent that, if the landlord voluntarily undertakes repairs on the premises, the landlord
must exercise reasonable care in performing such repairs." Robinson, 156 Idaho at 241, 322
P.3d at 323.
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What is missing in the Appellant's argument is cogent analysis as to how Mr. Stiles was
injured as a direct result of a negligent repair, i.e., the alleged failure to use reasonable and
ordinary care or skill in the execution of the work. While it is undisputed that Walter Amundson
removed the bay window from the home and placed it against a white picket fence next to the
driveway at the front of the property (R. p. 48), there are absolutely no facts in the record to
support even an inference that the removal of the window itself or its placement along the white
picket fence constituted a negligent repair to property.
The accident at issue occurred not because of the failure to use reasonable skill in the
execution of the home improvement project, but because one of the tenants placed a wooden tree
stump in a walkway. The tenants created a tripping hazard that had nothing to do with the
window removal project. Moreover, the window did not present a hazard to anyone until it was
broken by one tenant and moved by another tenant into the area that contained a wooden
stump/tripping hazard.
This is another example where the Appellant's argument regarding the window
represents a red herring. The hazard at issue in this case is the tree stump, not the broken
window. It is undisputed that the Plaintiff tripped on a wooden stump, falling forward into a
window. (R. p. 14). Even without the presence of the broken window, the Appellant could have
tripped and injured himself, whether he fell against the fence, or on the ground, or even into a
window attached to the home itself. While the presence of a broken window in the area where
the tree stump obstacle was located may have affected the particular injury allegedly suffered by
the Appellant, it did not represent the mechanism of the trip/fall event. Again, it is undisputed
that Walter Amundson had nothing to do with the presence of the wooden stump in the walkway
and had no knowledge of its presence or danger. (R. p. 48-49).
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Finally, even if the window could properly be viewed as the mechanism of the accident,
the Appellant is more accurately claiming that the window was improperly stored in the area
where the accident occurred, rather than claiming that the project to remove the window from the
garage was completed negligently. The facts in the record do not meet the Appellant's attempted
legal theory. When added to the fact that Walter Amundson had nothing to do with the window
becoming broken or the storage of the window in the location where the accident occurred, it
becomes clear that there is no legal or factual basis to find that the Respondent may be held
liable for a negligent repair.
c.

RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ON
APPEAL

On appeal, the Respondent requests attorney's fees under LC§ 12-121 and LA.R. 41 on
the basis that the Appellant brought this appeal simply to second guess the trial court and a
number of previous Idaho appellate decisions and, as such, the appeal is frivolous, unreasonable,
and without foundation. See Rendon v. Paskett, 126 Idaho 944, 945, 894 P.2d 775, 776 (Ct.
App. 1995). Further, the Respondent requests costs under LA.R. 40.
Respondent asserts that this appeal does not present issues associated with unresolved
law or a good faith request to extend existing law. The Appellant's primary assertion on appeal,
that Stephens v. Stearns abrogated the classifications of entrants on land in favor of a
determination that a landlord must exercise reasonable care to all entrants, is not a good faith
argument, especially given Idaho appellate decisions subsequent to Stephens which clearly
dictated that a landlord owes a duty of reasonable care only to the tenant of his or her property.
Further, the exact same arguments raised by the Appellant in this matter were asserted by the
appellant in the Robinson v. Mueller matter. The Idaho Court of Appeals in Robinson soundly
rejected the attempt to heighten the duty of care bar against landlords based on the application of
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over thirty years of Idaho appellate precedent. It was patently unreasonable for the Appellant to
have asserted the subject appeal based upon the clear and unwavering status of premises liability
law in Idaho.

V. CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the District Court's March 9, 2015, Order granting
Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment in this matter because the Appellant has failed to
demonstrate that the District Court based its decision on an erroneous conclusion of law. This
Court should sustain and conclude that the District Court's decision in this matter was
sufficiently based in law and fact and that there is no compelling public policy or logical basis to
change established precedent regarding the scope of a landlord's duties to a tenant's social
guests. Finally, the Respondent requests an award of fees and costs incurred in defending this
appeal.

-ff..

DATED this ((p-day of November, 2015.

ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP

By
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Michael P. Stefanie, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Respondent, Walter A. Amundson
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